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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
ERYK DREJ, 
Defendant / Appellant. 
Case No: 20080003-SC 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. RULE 24 
The State's Replacement Brief alleges that Drej's due process claim should be 
rejected "because he fails to properly present or analyze relevant authority and 
controlling precedent, as required by rule 24(a)(9), UTAH RULE OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE." Replacement Brief of Appellee at 20-21. Rule 24(a)(9) requires an 
appellant's brief to "contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to 
the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the 
trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." 
UTAH R. APP. PRO. 24. The brief goes on to allege that Drej violates rule 24 by failing to 
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acknowledge the federal case law rejecting the claim that federal due process requires a 
state to bear the burden of disproving affirmative defenses, citing Clark v. Arizona, 548 
U.S. 735, 126 S.Ct 2709, 165 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006), Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 
112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992), Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 
94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1986), Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 
281 (1977), mdLelandv. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952). 
These cases all stand for the principle that Federal Due Process does not compel 
the states to disprove the existence of affirmative defenses, a position that Drej does not 
contest. Presumably the State alleges that Drej has failed to include these cases as 
authority on the matter of Federal Due Process and that these cases are binding upon this 
Court making Drej's Replacement Brief incomplete. The State's allegation is a 
mischaracterization of Drej's argument. In fact, as is clear from Drej's Replacement 
Brief, Drej relies only on the Due Process Clause of the Utah State Constitution to justify 
the State's burden of disproving affirmative defenses. Federal Due Process is relied on to 
justify the State's burden of proving the elements of the charged crime, not affirmative 
defenses. Appellant's Replacement Brief at 9. Drej's argument was shaped by the cases 
mentioned by the State, but because Drej's claims relating to affirmative defenses are not 
based on Federal Due Process, these cases are not authoratative. Therefore, Drej's 
omission of related but non-binding case law is not a violation of Rule 24. 
IL DUE PROCESS 
Citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 120 
L.Ed.2d 353 (1992), the State notes that in order to "establish a denial of due process, 
2 
Defendant must show that the statute deprives him of a 'fundamental right.'" Appellee's 
Brief at 25-26. The State then alleges that "[t]he right to assert an affirmative defense is 
not fundamental." Id. Drej neither accepts nor rejects this allegation and claims that its 
truth is not relevant to his appeal. Rather, the fundamental right deprived by the burden 
of proof function in § 76-5-205.5 is right of a defendant to force the State to bear the 
burden of proof in criminal prosecutions. "It is fundamental that the State carries the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of an offense, including the 
absence of an affirmative defense once the defense in put into issue." State v. Low, 2008 
UT 58, If 45, 192 P.3d 867, 879 (Utah 2008) (emphasis added) {citing State v. Hill, 727 
P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986). 
The State's allegation that the State's requirement to bear the burden of proof for 
affirmative defenses "is solely a statutory directive and not a constitutional mandate" is 
not supported by the decisions of this court. As displayed in Low and Hill, in Utah, 
criminal defendants have a fundamental right to require the State to bear the burden of 
proving all elements of offenses and disproving any and all affirmative defenses put in 
issue by the evidence. Because special mitigation deprives Drej of his fundamental right 
to have the absence of affirmative defenses proved beyond a reasonable doubt, section 
76-5-205.5 denies due process of law and violates either both the Federal and Utah Due 
Process Clauses (in the case that special mitigation is considered an alternative method of 
proving manslaughter) or only the Utah Due Process Clause (in the case that special 
mitigation is considered an affirmative defense). 
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a, Utah Due Process (Special mitigation is either an element of 
manslaughter or an affirmative defense). 
The State's brief denies that special mitigation under § 76-5-205.5 is an 
affirmative defense. The State simplifies and then criticizes Drej's argument by stating 
"Defendant asserts that special mitigation is 'nearly identical' to imperfect self-defense in 
effect and, therefore, special mitigation must be an affirmative defense." Appellee's 
Replacement Brief at 29. The State goes on to say that the only similarities between 
special mitigation and imperfect self-defense are that both reduce murder to manslaughter 
and aggravated murder to murder. The State then declares that "[a]ny similarity ends 
there" noting the differences between the two statutes. Id. 
Drej is not surprised that each of the differences the State notes between special 
mitigation and imperfect self-defense arise from the elements of special mitigation Drej 
has alleged are unconstitutional (namely, that reduction to manslaughter does not occur 
by default, a function of the improper burden of proof). It is of no help to the State to 
allege that special mitigation is not an affirmative defense because the Legislature 
unconstitutionally created a statute to take the place of a defense but placed the burden on 
the defendant. 
Drej also asserts that the State's allegation that the affirmative defense of 
imperfect self-defense may be considered before determining whether or not the elements 
of the underlying murder charge have been proved is an erroneous allegation. Appellee's 
Brief at 30 citing State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ffif 5-6, 63 P.3d 94 (Utah 2002), State 
v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 869-70 (Utah 1998). The State claims that imperfect self-
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defense is different from special mitigation because unlike special mitigation, "a jury 
may not be directed to first determine if the defendant is guilty of murder, before it 
considers imperfect self-defense." Appellee's Brief at 30. On this point the State is 
absolutely wrong. Both Shumway and Piansiaksone are cases in which this Court 
prohibited such an instruction but because the manslaughter instruction was for a lesser 
included offense, not as an affirmative defense. See Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ^  4 
(erroneous manslaughter jury instruction related to manslaughter as a lesser included 
offense to murder), see also Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 869 (instruction on manslaughter 
as a lesser included offense is erroneous if the court mandates specific order of 
deliberation). A lesser included offense manslaughter is significantly different than an 
affirmative defense manslaughter. In contrast to Shumway, with imperfect self-defense, 
as with all affirmative defenses, the underlying offense must be proved and found before 
the affirmative defense can be considered, otherwise the affirmative defense is both 
unnecessary, and in the case of imperfect self-defense, harmful (because if the underlying 
elements of murder are not found the defendant should be acquitted not found guilty of 
manslaughter). 
The State's appeal to State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, 18 P.3d 1123 (Utah App. 
2001) similarly confuses self-defense with the affirmative defense of imperfect self-
defense. Appellee's Brief at 30. In Garcia, the defendant presented evidence of self-
defense claiming that he knew that the victim would kill him and the trial court found he 
had met the quantum of evidence needed for a self-defense instruction. Garcia, 18 P.3d at 
1127. The court held that merely reasonable doubt as to self-defense would require an 
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acquittal. But the State cites Garcia for the proposition that "if a jury merely harbors a 
reasonable doubt as to whether imperfect self-defense exists, it must find manslaughter." 
That proposition, not only is not supported by Garcia, but is false unless the jury first 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the underlying murder. Appellee's Brief 
at 30. In stark contrast to the State's position on page 30 Just like special mitigation, the 
affirmative defense of imperfect self-defense first requires a finding that the charged 
murder has been established, otherwise the defense is unnecessary. 
Drej's argument, that special mitigation is actually an affirmative defense 
mislabeled as mitigation, depends largely upon the fact that special mitigation under § 
76-5-205.5 is nothing like mitigation and acts essentially like an affirmative defense, 
except for its improper burden of proof. In response, the State alleges that the special 
verdict under § 76-5-205.5 is mitigation because it makes the impact of the murder 
finding "less severe, intense, and painful" as a matter of public policy. Appellee's 
Replacement Brief at 25. Rather than mitigating punishment due to extenuating 
circumstances as with traditional mitigation, this mitigation lessens the verdict due to 
reduced culpability. Drej argues that this is merely a semantic means of moving the 
burden of proof on an affirmative defense to a defendant, and that this shift violates the 
constitution. 
The State alleges that "even if special mitigation were characterized as an 
affirmative defense, due process would not preclude placing on Defendant its burden of 
proof because the public policy prevents the courts from interfering with the 
"particularly arduous" task of determining criminal accountability. Appellee's 
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Replacement Brief at 25, citing State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995). The State's 
attempts to characterize the Legislature's designation of the burden of proof with respect 
to special mitigation as a "serious and difficult task" and a matter of public policy not to 
be interfered with by the courts falls short. Appellee's Replacement Brief at 25. It falls 
short because its reasoning only justifies the creation of the substantive aspects of special 
mitigation, the legality of which Drej does not contest. The Legislature had the power 
and responsibility to create special mitigation in its efforts to confront the culpability of 
mentally ill offenders; the substantive elements of the rule are both proper and 
commendable. 
However, the State's argument does not reach the procedural aspects of special 
mitigation and Drej denies that the Court owes any deference to the Legislature on 
matters of procedure, especially where due process rights are concerned. At issue is the 
burden of proof, the procedural function of the statute; and the public policy restricting 
the Judiciary on matter of substance evaporates on matters of procedure and 
constitutional protections. If special mitigation is an affirmative defense, Utah's Due 
Process Clause requires the State to bear the burden of proving its non-existence beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Because, special mitigation functions as an affirmative defense, 
having an effect on culpability and verdict not merely sentencing, the Legislature's 
designation as mitigation should be ruled an unconstitutional attempt to avoid placing the 
burden of proof upon the State. 
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b. Federal Due Process (Special mitigation is an element of 
manslaughter). 
The State denies that special mitigation is an alternative method of proving 
manslaughter by noting that mitigated manslaughter (a murder verdict reduced to 
manslaughter) exists only after the charged murder has been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Appellee's Replacement Brief at 31-32. The State uses Low to arguing that 
special mitigation, like imperfect self-defense, is a defense and not a "separately 
chargeable offense" and thus cannot be an alternative means of proving manslaughter. 
Appellee's Brief at 32 citing State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, \ 57 & n.6. While it would be 
Drej's preference for the Court to follow the State's suggestion and consider special 
mitigation an affirmative defense similar to imperfect self-defense (see subsection (a) 
supra at 4) for the sake of this particular argument Drej asserts the State cannot have it 
both ways. Either, as the State suggests, special mitigation is not an affirmative defense 
and thus not subject to the charge that special mitigation cannot also be a chargeable 
offense under the manslaughter statute and subject to the burdens of both the Federal and 
Utah Due Process Clauses. Or, as the State later suggests, special mitigation is an 
affirmative defense like imperfect self-defense and, although not a separable chargeable 
offense, is then subject to burdens created by the Utah Due Process Clause upon 
affirmative defenses. 
The State criticizes Drej's citation to Utah's death penalty procedures claiming 
that bifurcated trials may be used in many circumstances therefore special mitigation is 
not an element of manslaughter. Appellee's Brief at 32. Drej's references to bifurcated 
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capital proceedings were not used to prove that special mitigation "must be an element of 
manslaughter" as the State presumes, but rather merely to distinguish special mitigation 
under § 76-5-205.5 from traditional mitigation and to give an example of how matters of 
culpability or guilt are distinct from mitigation. The reference is designed to emphasize 
that the concern, when presenting special mitigation, is to determine the culpability of the 
defendant, independent of determining the mitigating or aggravating factors for 
punishment. 
In sum, Utah's Constitution requires the State to bear the burden of proof for all 
elements of crimes and disprove any affirmative defenses. The United States 
Constitution requires the State to bear the burden to prove all elements of crimes. Special 
mitigation is either a mislabeled affirmative defense or an alternative means of proving 
manslaughter. Either only state or both state and federal due process require Utah to bear 
the burden of proof with regard to special mitigation. 
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The Utah Constitution prohibits the Legislature from adopting rules of procedure 
and prohibits it from amending rules of procedure unless it does so by a two-thirds 
majority vote. UTAH CONST. ART. V, sec. 1 (members of one branch of government are 
not to exercise functions belonging to either of the others, unless expressly excepted), 
Utah Const. Art. VIII, sec. 4 ("Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure... 
Legislature may amend the Rules of Procedure... upon a vote of two-thirds"). Drej has 
alleged that the Legislature violated the separation of powers when it enacted § 76-5-
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205.5l by either adopting a new rule of procedure or by amending the existing rules 
found in § 76-1-501(1) (criminal defendant presumed innocent until proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt) or § 76-l-502(2)(b) (any affirmative defense must be negated 
by proof if evidence of the defense has been presented). The State in turn has denied that 
allegation by first claiming that § 76-5-205.5's burden of proof function is not a rule of 
procedure and that the Legislature typically allocates the burden of proof for each 
statutory claim or benefit it creates. Appellee's Brief at 22, 35-37. Drej responds to those 
arguments in turn. 
a. Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-205.5's burden of proof is a rule of 
procedure for the purposes of the separation of powers. 
The State has missed the point of Drej's reference to Brickyard Homeowners v. 
Gibbons Reality Co., 668 P.2d 535 (Utah 1983) when it alleges that Drej ignores the 
"facts and holding" of the case. Appellee's Replacement Brief at 36. It is true that in 
Brickyard this Court held that the challenged statute, Utah Code Annotated § 57-8-33, 
did not violate the separation of powers doctrine by finding that "nothing in § 57-8-33 [] 
prescribes the course, form, manner, means, method, mode, order, process or steps by 
which" individual's rights are enforced but rather is "clearly a statute of substantive rules 
and principles which fix and declare the primary rights of individuals..." Brickyard, 668 
P.2d at 539 (internal citations omitted). However, the distinction between the statute in 
Brickyard and special mitigation under § 76-5-205.5 is the very reason Drej cited 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205.5 was originally passed in 1999 with less than two-thirds of 
the vote. See Appellant's Replacement Brief at 31. Section 76-5-205.5 was amended in 
2009 with more than two-thirds but the burden of proof was not altered in that 
amendment. 
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Brickyard in the first place. Section 57-8-33 provides a right in property managers to 
bring suits on behalf of property owners but does not proscribe the means, method, or 
manner to enforce that right,2 whereas § 76-5-205.5 provides for both the substantive 
right to special mitigation and the means, method, or process by which that right is 
enforced, the burden of proof. Defendant does not disagree that § 76-5-205.5 provides a 
substantive 'benefit' to a delusional defendant, but it also proscribes the procedural 
means by which the courts of this State are obliged to enforce that benefit. The 
procedural element is the unconstitutional part of the statute. In Brickyardthere was no 
procedural element so this Court upheld the statute. Here the State has not denied that 
the burden of proof function of special mitigation is a rule of procedure,3 albeit, within a 
statute creating a substantive benefit. 
Because it contains a procedural rule and was created by the Legislature, § 76-5-
205.5 violates the separation of powers by failing to be passed by a two-thirds majority. 
In an attempt to avoid the fact that a burden of proof is a rule of procedure governed by 
Article VIII, Section 4 of the Constitution of Utah, the State attempts to use a "greater 
Utah Code Annotated § 57-8-33 "Without limiting the rights of any unit owner, actions 
may be brought by the manager or management committee, in either case in the 
discretion of the management committee, on behalf of two or more of the unit owners, as 
their respective interest may appear, with respect to any cause of action relating to the 
common areas and facilities or more than one unit. Service of process on two or more 
unit owners in any action relating to the common areas and facilities or more than one 
unit may be made on the person designated in the declaration to receive service of 
process." 
3
 "[T]he special mitigation statute is not a procedural rule but a new substantive benefit. 
Its burden-placement provision defines the method by which entitlement to the benefit 
may be established'' Appellee's Replacement Brief at 36 (emphasis added); see 
Brickyard at 539 (this Court defines procedure as the method by which a party enforces 
substantive rights.) 
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contains the lesser" type of argument. The State cites Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 
197 (1977) for the proposition that the "legislative right to create a new substantive 
benefit includes within it the right to determine how entitlement to it is established" 
which "necessarily includes legislatively designating a burden of proof." Appellee's 
Replacement Brief at 35, citing Patterson, 432 U.S. at 209. Patterson, interpreting the 
Federal Due Process Clause, allows a State to choose to recognize a factor that mitigates 
the degree of criminality or punishment and the State is not required to prove its 
nonexistence "if in its judgment this would be too cumbersome, too expensive, and too 
inaccurate." Patterson at 209. Thus, as discussed above, Federal Due Process is not 
implicated if special mitigation is considered to be an affirmative defense. Supra at 2. 
However, Patterson does not address the Utah Due Process concerns nor the Utah 
Constitutional limits on legislative power to create procedural rules, it merely rebuts the 
Federal Due Process requirement with respect to affirmative defenses, a claim which Drej 
has not presented. 
The State alleges "the legislative right to create a new substantive benefit includes 
within it, the right to determine how entitlement to it is established." Appellee's Brief at 
34-35. The State again cites a footnote in Patterson, 432 U.S. at 209 n. 11, for the 
proposition that the right to determine how entitlement to a substantive benefit 
"necessarily includes" the legislative right to designate a burden of proof. Appellee's 
Brief at 35. However, the State's reliance on Patterson is improper based on Utah's 
expanded view of due process and the fundamental right to have affirmative defenses 
disproved beyond a reasonable doubt by the State. See discussion of Low supra at 3. 
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Although the Court in Patterson declined to adopt a constitutional imperative that 
a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt facts constituting affirmative defenses, 
it did not prohibit the several states from adopting its own imperative. In fact the Court 
noted that "as a matter of policy" the burden of disproving affirmative defenses would 
normally be placed on the prosecution. Patterson at 209. Obviously Patterson does not 
stand for the proposition that the Legislature's power to create new substantive crimes 
necessarily includes the legislative right to designate the burden of proof. The same 
principle applies here. In Utah, as demonstrated in Low, the limitation created by due 
process not only prevents the Legislature from altering the burden of proof related to 
elements of a crime but also the burdens related to affirmative defenses. In other words, 
in Utah, the legislative right to create a new substantive benefit, which acts either as an 
affirmative defense or element of a crime, does not include the right to legislatively 
designate a burden of proof. 
The State's challenges to Drej's assertion that special mitigation contains a rule of 
procedure fall flat. The State relies on irrelevant cases and misreads relevant ones. When 
determining whether or not the burden of proof function within special mitigation is 
procedural for the purposes of separation of powers Drej again encourages this Court to 
analyze it in light of Petty v. Clark, 192 P.2d 589, 594-95 (Utah 1948), Brickyard, 668 
P.2d 535, 539 (Utah 1983), and the arguments set forth in Appellant's Replacement Brief 
at 29-32. 
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b. Prior legislatively designated burdens of proof 
As an alternative, the State seems to say that even if the burden of proof within 
special mitigation is procedural it does not violate the separation of powers because the 
Legislature regularly allocates burdens of proof. Appellant's Brief at 22, 36. In its brief 
the State cites numerous Utah statutes where the legislature has created a claim or benefit 
and allocated the corresponding burden of proof as evidence that such conduct is not 
unconstitutional. Appellee's Brief at 22, 36-37. As a practical matter, Drej has not 
requested this Court, nor would it be appropriate, to consider the constitutionality of 
unrelated statutes. Furthermore, it is a fallacy to suggest that repeatedly passing statutes 
with similar elements has any rational relationship to those statutes being legitimate 
exercises of legislative power. The Legislature's power is not expanded by repeatedly 
violating the constitution. In other words, many wrongs would not make a right. Drej 
asserts that § 76-5-205.5 should be reviewed for its own sake and not for its similarity to 
other unchallenged statutes. 
For the sake of argument Drej maintains that the State's position is without merit 
for another reason as well. Upon examining the statutes Drej has discovered that each 
and every criminal statute provided by the State as examples of legislatively designated 
burdens of proof, along with several others, do not violate separation of powers and thus 
are not persuasive. 
Utah Code Annotated § 19-5-115 created a burden of proof wherein a defendant 
charged with water pollution bears the burden to establish the existence of an affirmative 
defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This law was originally passed in 1981 but 
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the burden of proof function was not added until 19984 where it was amended by a vote 
of 65 to 3 with 7 absent or not voting in the House5 and a vote of 29 to 0 with 0 absent or 
not voting in the Senate.6 With such numbers the Legislature was well within the two-
thirds requirement to adopt a rule of procedure. Similarly in Utah Code Annotated § 19-
2-115 an alleged polluter can raise an affirmative defense but bears the burden by a 
preponderance that his endangering conduct was consented to and was reasonably 
foreseeable. This law was passed originally in the same bill as § 19-5-115 in 1981 and 
then amended to include the burden of proof function in the same bill In 1998.7 
Another example raised by the State was Utah Code Annotated § 58-37c-20 where 
a defendant may establish a complete affirmative defense to possession of certain 
controlled substances by showing by a preponderance that they are authorized to possess 
those substances. The law was originally passed with the burden of proof function in 
19988 by a vote of 57 to 8 with 10 absent in the House9 and a vote of 23 to 0 with 6 
absent or not voting in the Senate.10 Again the Legislature obtained enough votes to 
qualify for the constitutionally required two-thirds vote to create a rule of procedure. 
The State mentioned Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-19.7 where a defendant carries 
the burden of proving a complete affirmative defense by a preponderance. This law was 
4
 Laws of the State of Utah, 1998 General Session of the 52nd Legislature, Chapter 271. 
5
 Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Utah, 52nd Legislature, 1998 
General Session, page 414. 
6
 State of Utah Senate Journal, 1998 General Session of the 52nd Legislature, page 895. 
7
 See fh. 2,3,4. 
8
 Laws of the State of Utah, 1998 General Session of the 52nd Legislature, Chapter 100. 
9
 Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Utah, 52nd Legislature, 1999 
General Session, page 579. 
10
 State of Utah Senate Journal, 1998 General Session of the 52nd Legislature, page 809. 
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passed with the burden of proof function in 2000 by a vote of 70 to 0 with 5 absent or not 
voting in the House and 28 to 0 with 1 absent or not voting in the Senate.1 { Again well 
beyond the required two-thirds. 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8 contains a defense for a Native American 
defendant charged with possession of peyote to prove by a preponderance that the 
possession was for traditional ceremonial purposes. The law was originally passed in 
1971 but the affirmative defense and the burden of proof function were added by 
amendment in 2006l2 by a vote of 66 to 0 with 9 absent or not voting in the House13 and 
20 to 0 with 9 absent or not voting in the Senate.14 Yet again, if this laws burden of proof 
function is considered a rule of procedure its adoption by the Legislature would be 
constitutional because it exceeded the two-thirds requirement. 
Utah Code Annotated § 72-10-115 requires that under a criminal prosecution for 
flying without a license, if a defendant relies on a license he has the burden of proving 
that the license is proper. This law, including the burden placing function, was passed in 
193715 by a vote of 50 to 0 with 10 absent or not voting in the House16 and 18 to 0 with 5 
absent or not voting in the Senate satisfying the two-thirds requirement.17 
11
 See House Bill 81 March 1, 2000. 
12
 Laws of the State of Utah, 2006, Vol. 1, General Session of the 56th Legislature, 
Chapter 8. 
13
 Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Utah, 2006 General Session, 
56th Legislature, page 255. 
14
 State of Utah Senate Journal, 2006 General Session of the 56th Legislature, page 497. 
15
 Laws of Utah, 1937 Regular Session of the 22nd Legislature, Chapter 10, § 9. 
16
 Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Utah, 22nd Legislature, 1937 
Regular Session, page 682. 
17
 State of Utah Senate Journal, 1937 Regular Session of the 22nd Legislature, page 556. 
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Each of the examples was passed in both houses by a two-thirds majority 
satisfying the requirements of Article VIII, section 4. While this may merely be a 
coincidence, it at least serves to rebut the State's argument that the Legislature regularly 
enacts criminal statutes that contain burdens of proof without regard to Article VIII. In 
the case of the burden of proof function in § 76-5-205.5, the Legislature did not satisfy 
those conditions and thus its burden of proof function is unconstitutional. 
In a string cite nearly a page long the State provided approximately twenty five 
more statutes within the Utah Code, outside the criminal code, that contain some type of 
burden of proof function as further evidence that allocating burdens of proof is a common 
task performed by the Legislature. Appellants Brief at 36-37. For the sake of brevity 
Drej will not address the voting records of each of these statutes. Suffice to say, many of 
these statutes were passed by a two-thirds majority.18 The several that were not19 are of 
no concern to this Court for the reasons stated above. 
IV. STRIKE OFFENDING LANGUAGE 
The State's rejects Drej's claim that if this Court finds special mitigation 
unconstitutional it may strike the offending portion and leave the remainder of § 76-5-
205.5 in tact. Appellee's Brief at 43-46. The State claims that, if unconstitutional, the 
18
 Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-2-502.7, 10-9a-705, 13-14-304, 13-35-304, 19-2-115, 19-7-106, 
26-20-15, 31A-27a-108, 34A-2-413, 34A-2-704, 39-1-45, 49-11-613, 53-5-704, 54-8-23, 
and 54-8b-2.3. 
19
 Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-2-7, 13-35-202, 32A-12-102, 34A-2-402, 34A-3-106 , 34A-2-
417, and 34A-3-109. Drej was unable to locate the voting records for several statutes and 
at least one statute, Utah Code Ann. § 24-1-4, was enacted by initiative. 
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entire statute should be stricken because to only strike the offending portions would 
superimpose a presumption that would defeat the purpose of the statute and render other 
subsections of the statute inconsistent and inoperable. Appellee's Brief at 43, 45. The 
crux of this issue is what constitutes the Legislature's intent with respect to special 
mitigation for the purposes of an examination under State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, % 18, 
980 P.2d 191 (Utah 1999) (the unoffending portion of a statute should be saved by 
severing the unconstitutional part if legislative intent allows it). 
According the Senate debates the Legislature's intent in enacting special 
mitigation was (1) to create a "hedge against the Herrera decision" and (2) achieve a 
sense of fairness for the truly mentally ill so long as the defendants bear the burden to 
establish it. Senate Floor Debates, S.B.20 Special Mitigation for Mentally 111 Offenders, 
January 25, 1999. As discussed in Drej's opening brief, those two purposes are served 
without the burden of proof. Appellant's Brief at 45-48. 
The State also alleges that the Legislature intended to impose "no additional 
burden on the prosecution in charging or obtaining a guilty verdict" and "create a special 
benefit" only if defendants bore the burden..." Appellee's Brief at 45 citing Senate Floor 
Debates, S.B.20 Special Mitigation for Mentally 111 Offenders. Drej asserts that because 
those intentions were contrary to constitutional mandates and the other explicit purposes 
are served, the offending portion of § 76-5-205.5 can be stricken leaving the substantive 
benefit intact. 
Drej admits that after reading the State's brief his request that the Court strike a 
portion of subsection (5)(a) is insufficient to render § 76-5-205.5 both constitutional and 
18 
internally consistent. Upon closer review, Drej now asserts that this Court should strike 
the following portions of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-205.5: 
(5)(a) If the trier of fact finds the elements of an offense as listed in Subsection 
(5)(b) are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and also that the existence of special 
mitigation under this section is established by a preponderance of the evidence, it 
shall return a verdict on the reduced charge as provided in Subsection (5)(b). 
(b) If under Subsection (5)(a) the offense is: 
(i) aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of 
murder; 
(ii) attempted aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead be found 
guilty of attempted murder; 
(iii) murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of manslaughter; 
or 
(iv) attempted murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of 
attempted manslaughter. 
(6)(a) If a jury is the trier of fact, a unanimous vote of the jury is required to 
establish the existence of the special mitigation. 
(b) If the jury does find special mitigation by a unanimous vote, it shall return 
a verdict on the reduced charge as provided in Subsection (5). 
(c) If the jury finds by a unanimous vote that special mitigation has not been 
established, it shall convict the defendant of the greater offense for which the 
prosecution has established all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(d) If the jury is unable to unanimously agree whether or not special 
mitigation has been established, the result is a hung jury. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Utah Legislature violated the Utah Constitution and arguably the United States 
Constitution when it enacted Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-205.5 by including a burden of 
proof function and by placing that burden upon criminal defendants. Drej asks that this 
Court hold § 76-5-205.5 unconstitutional insofar as it places the burden of proof upon 
defendants and strike the offending portions of subsection (5)(a) and (6) with a holding 
that special mitigation provided for in the statute should either be considered an 
affirmative defense subject to State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, \ 45, and Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-1-502, or an alternative means of proving manslaughter under § 76-5-205 subject to 
19 
In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) to ensure 
the burden of proof rests upon the State. 
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